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Unraveling SCADA Protocols: Using Sulley Fuzzer

DV Labs

- Ganesh Devarajan



DEF CON

- Introduction to SCADA networks
 - Overview
 - SCADA Protocols
 - Modbus
 - DNP3
 - ICCP
 - UCA 2.0 and IEC 61850 Standards
- SCADA Security
 - Attack scenarios
 - Past known attacks
- SCADA Fuzzer
- Demo
- Conclusion
- Future work

SCADA


- ***Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition*** is defined as a common process control application that collects data from sensors on the shop floor or in remote locations and sends them to a central computer for management and control.
 - Large scale distributed measurement and control system (North America)
 - System that performs SCADA irrespective of the size and geographical distribution (Rest of the world)
 - Wikipedia
- SCADA is a technology that enables a user to collect data from one or more distant facilities and/or send limited control instructions to those facilities – Ronald L. Kurtz

- It is the vital component of many Critical Infrastructure
- They are used for sensing/managing real-time data
 - Water
 - Gas
 - Electricity
 - Refineries
 - Nuclear plants
 - Other manufacturing operations.

➤ SCADA System Components

- Operator – Human
 - Person responsible to make the Supervisory control decisions
 - Might be present in the local or remote site.
- Human Machine Interface (HMI)
 - Presents data to the user/operator
 - GUIs, Schematics, Windows
- Master Terminal Unit (MTU)
 - Processes the data and presents it to HMI
 - Collects data from remote sites
 - Sends out queries and instructions to the remote nodes
- Communication channel
 - Internet, wireless, switched network, etc
- Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
 - Sends the abstracted data to the MTU
 - RTU sends out control signals to the sensors and collects data values from them


Traditional SCADA Networks




- Control Level Network
- Device Level Network
- Information Level Network (Ethernet)

MES: Manufacturing Execution Systems
 PDM: Process Data Management
 MRO: Maintenance Repair and Overhaul
 CAPP: Computer Assisted Process Planning

Off late SCADA Networks



Current/Future SCADA Networks



The need for security in SCADA systems

- When these protocols were initially created they were proprietary and were not linked to the outside world. But with the improved communication protocols they were exposed more to the Internet. The systems that control our day to day living is exposed to the outside world without any inbuilt security features.
- It is easier to take down the entire country's Critical Infrastructure.
 - Black out
- On a smaller scale you can take down the company's manufacturing plant.
 - The cooling system of the Server room
 - False reports at the manufacturing plant

- Poor Authentication or verification of the client nodes
 - There is no authentication scheme implemented in these protocols
 - Easy to introduce malicious nodes
- Platform Vulnerabilities
 - Windows & Linux Vulnerabilities
 - Not patched regularly – need for maximum uptime
- Vendors and Asset owners believes
 - Under the wrong impression that who is going to hack into these networks
 - Belief that their nodes are not exposed to the outside world
 - What if a malicious node was introduced into the network?
 - A few dangling nodes outside the protected area, that can be used to attack

- Providing False Data - The functionality of the RTU is to either read or write data into the server and the compromised RTU can write false data into the server.
 - Sensors for Water pollutants
 - Temperature sensors in server rooms
- Denial of Service Attack
 - Continuous sting of reboot command
- Protocol anomalies

- Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared
 - Washington Post, June 27, 2002 Mountain View, Calif
- Information-technology contractor Vitek Boden who used his knowledge of control systems to release millions of liters of sewage into drinking water
- Slammer worm affected the operation of the corporate network at Ohio's inactive Davis-Besse nuclear plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours in January 2003
- An hacker took control of the gas pipelines run by Gazprom for around 24 hours in 1999 in Russia

- Modbus
- Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3)
- Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP)
- Utility Communications Architecture 2.0 (UCA 2.0) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850 Standards
- Control Area Networks (CAN)
- Control Information Protocol (CIP)
- DeviceNet
- ControlNet
- OLE for Process Control (OPC)
- Profibus

➤ Modbus

- Developed in the late 1970s by Modicon, Inc.
- It is commonly used for connecting devices in the Industrial environment
- It is free and open sourced

➤ Modbus RTU- Compact Binary format

➤ Modbus ASCII- more verbose and human readable

➤ Modbus/TCP is similar to Modbus RTU Data is stuffed into TCP/IP Data packets



```

0000 00 02 b3 ce 70 51 00 20 78 00 62 0d 08 00 45 00  ....pQ. x.b...E.
0010 00 34 85 83 40 00 80 06 61 05 0a 00 00 39 0a 00  .4..@... a....9..
0020 00 03 0a 12 01 f6 61 97 f1 83 70 f1 ad 1b 50 18  .....a. ..p...P.
0030 fa f0 19 52 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 0a 08 00 04  ...R... ..
0040 00 00
  
```


Force Listen Mode

Function Code	Function Name
01	Read Coil Status
02	Read Input Status
03	Read Holding Registers
04	Read Input Registers
05	Force Single Coil
06	Preset Single Register
07	Read Exception Status
09	Program 484
0A	Poll 484
0B	Fetch Communication Event Counter
0C	Fetch Communication Event Log
0D	Program Controller
0E	Poll Controller
0F	Force Multiple Coils
10	Preset Multiple Registers
11	Report Slave ID
12	Program 884/M84
13	Reset Communication Link
14	Read General Reference
15	Write General Reference
16	Mask Write 4X Register
17	Read/Write 4X Registers
18	Read FIFO Queue

SCADA Protocols - Modbus

Function Code	Sub-Function Code	Function Name
08	00	Return Query Data
08	01	Restart Communication Option
08	02	Return Diagnostic Register
08	03	Change ASCII Input Delimiter
08	04	Force Listen Only Mode
08	05-09	Reserved
08	0A	Clear Counters and Diagnostic Reg.
08	0B	Return Bus Message Count
08	0C	Return Bus Communication Error Count
08	0D	Return Bus Exception Error Count
08	0E	Return Slave Message Count
08	0F	Return Slave No Response Count
08	10	Return Slave NAK Count
08	11	Return Slave Busy Count
08	12	Return Bus Char. Overrun Count
08	13	Return Overrun Error Count
08	14	Clear Overrun Counter and Flag
08	15	Get/Clear Modbus Plus Statistics
08	16-UP	Reserved

- Distributed Network Protocol 3
- Mainly used in the utility companies



```


0000 00 02 b3 ce 70 51 00 50 04 93 70 67 08 00 45 00  ....pQ.P ..pg..E.
0010 00 40 4c 82 40 00 80 06 9a 2b 0a 00 00 08 0a 00  .@L.@... .+.....
0020 00 03 0a e5 4e 20 55 1c 1a fb 52 c6 38 a8 50 18  ....N U. ..R.8.P.
0030 ff dd 07 f3 00 00 05 64 11 c4 04 00 03 00 4e ef  ....d .....N.
0040 c2 c2 15 3c 02 06 3c 03 06 3c 04 06 b1 ec  ...<.<. .<....
  
```

↖ Disable Spontaneous messages

Bit	Internal Indication Flag
0	Last received message was Broadcast message
1	Class 1 Data available
2	Class 2 Data available
3	Class 3 Data available
4	Time Synchronization Required
5	Digital Output in Local
6	Device Trouble
7	Device Restarted
8	Function Code (Not Implemented)
9	Requested Object Unknown or Application Error
10	Parameters Out of range
11	Even buffer overflowed
12	Operation already executing
13	Configuration Corrupt
14	Not used (returns 0)
15	Not used (returns 0)

- Control Byte
 - Control function code
- Transport Layer byte
 - First-Final
 - Sequence Number
- Application Layer Control Byte
 - First-Final
 - Confirm
 - Sequence
- Data chunking
 - CRC DNP
 - 2 CRC bytes Every 16 bytes of data

- Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol
- Telecontrol Application Service Element (TASE)
- Developed by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Northern States Power (NSP)
- Is used for communication between the Control centers and the WANs
- Used widely in the Utility organizations
- Associations – Connections
- Bilateral Table (BLT) – Stores the Associations and end point agreements
- Uses Application Control Service Element (ACSE) to Associate and manage connections
- Multiple Associations can be managed by ACSE



➤ TPKT


- Most software that I have seen have the version set to 03
- The Reserved byte is 00
- Finally the Length varies based on the other layers Information



```


0000 00 0c 29 d8 e9 f2 00 c0 4f 0c 7b 1d 08 00 45 00  ..)..... O.{...E.
0010 00 6c a2 9c 40 00 80 06 2f 11 0a 0a 0a 65 0a 0a  .l..@... /....e..
0020 0a 66 00 66 0c 03 04 ef 16 ed 4d 7c 55 b6 50 18  .f.f.... ..M|U.P.
0030 3f 6c c8 a1 00 00 03 00 00 44 02 f0 80 01 00 01  ?l..... ..D.....
0040 00 61 37 30 35 02 01 01 a0 30 a3 2e a0 2c a1 1f  .a705... .0.....
0050 a1 1d 1a 0e 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  ....AAAA AAAAAAAAA
0060 41 41 1a 0b 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AA..AAAA AAAAAAA.
0070 09 80 01 02 80 01 02 80 01 02  .....
```

➤ Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol (COTP) – ISO 8073



0000	00	c0	4f	0c	7b	1d	00	0c	29	d8	e9	f2	08	00	45	00	..O.{...).....E.	
0010	00	52	e5	de	40	00	80	06	eb	e8	0a	0a	0a	66	0a	0a	.R..@... ..f..	
0020	0a	65	0c	03	00	66	4d	7c	50	b2	04	ef	11	0a	50	18	.e...fM P.....P.	
0030	44	70	60	57	00	00	03	00	00	2a	25	e0	00	00	00	01	Dp`w.... *%.....	
0040	00	c1	0c	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	c2	...AAAAA AAAAAA.	
0050	0c	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	c0	01	0b	.BBBBBBB BBBB...


➤ Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol (COTP) – ISO 8073



Data Transfer F0

0000	00	0c	29	d8	e9	f2	00	c0	4f	0c	7b	1d	08	00	45	00	..)	o.	{...	E.
0010	00	6c	a2	9c	40	00	80	06	2f	11	0a	0a	0a	65	0a	0a	.]	@...	/...	e..	
0020	0a	66	00	66	0c	03	04	ef	16	ed	4d	7c	55	b6	50	18	.f.	f....	..M	U.P.	
0030	3f	6c	c8	a1	00	00	03	00	00	44	02	f0	80	01	00	01	?]D	...	
0040	00	61	37	30	35	02	01	01	a0	30	a3	2e	a0	2c	a1	1f	.a	705...	.0...	,...	
0050	a1	1d	1a	0e	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAA	AAAAAAA		
0060	41	41	1a	0b	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	a0	AA.	AAAA	AAAAAAA.		
0070	09	80	01	02	80	01	02	80	01	02								

➤ Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol (COTP) – ISO 8073



Disconnect Request 80

```

0000  00 c0 4f 0c 7b 1d 00 0c 29 d8 e9 f2 08 00 45 00  ..O.{... ).....E.
0010  00 33 e6 72 40 00 80 06 eb 73 0a 0a 0a 66 0a 0a  .3.r@... .s...f..
0020  0a 65 0c 03 00 66 4d 7c 55 b6 04 ef 17 31 50 18  .e...fM| U....1P.
0030  44 2c ed 6d 00 00 03 00 00 0b 06 80 00 01 00 01  D,.m.... ..
0040  81
    
```

- What does the SCADA Fuzzer detect?
 - Protocol anomalies
 - Unauthorized client/server communication
 - Unauthorized client/server command execution
 - Possible Denial of Service attacks
- What protocols are we covering today?
 - MODBUS
 - DNP3
 - ICCP
 - TPKT
 - COTP




➤ Fuzzer Components

- `__init.py` – Defines all the aliases
- `blocks.py` – Defines blocks and block helpers
- `pedrpc.py` – Communication purposes and an interface with the main fuzzer
- `primitives.py` – the fuzzer primitives includes string, static, etc
- `sessions.py` – Functionality for building and executing session
- `sex.py` – Sulley's exception Handler

➤ Agents

- `network_monitor.py` – Monitors network communications and logs the pcap files
- `process_monitor.py` – Detects the faults
- `vmcontrol.py` – Interfaced with the VM image to start, stop, suspend and reset the image along with deleting and restoring the snapshots

SCADA Fuzzer Architecture



Sulley Fuzz Control RUNNING

Total:	43 of 221 [=====] 19.457%
5168: op-3:	4 of 84 [=] 4.762%

Pause
Resume

Test Case # Crash Synopsis

000042 [INVALID]:41414141 Unable to disassemble at 41414141 from thread 628 caused access violation

- Web GUI of Sulley
- www.fuzzing.org
- Fuzzing book



```

s_initialize("MODBUSFUNCCODE01")
# Transaction ID
s_static("\x00\x01")
# Modbus Protocol Identifier
s_static("\x00\x00")
# Length bytes
s_sizer("modlength", length=2, name="length", endian=">", fuzzable=False)
if s_block_start("modlength"):
# Unity Identifier
s_static("\x0D")
# Function Code
s_byte(0x01)
# Data or Sub function Code
s_dword(0x00000000)
s_block_end()

```



Static Length

```

s_initialize("DNP3StaticLength")
if s_block_start("header"):
    s_static("\x05\x64") # Start Sync Bytes.
    # Length Bytes we are having it as a constant length at first
    s_static("\x12")
    # Control Byte
    s_byte(0xc4, full_range=True)
    # Destination Address
    s_short(0x0400)
    # Source Address
    s_short(0x300)
    s_block_end()
# Checksum of the DNP Header.
s_checksum("header", algorithm=dnpcrc16, length=2)

# The Data Portion of the Packet
if s_block_start("Data"):
    # Transport Layer Chunk
    s_byte(0xc2, full_range=True)
    # Application Chunk
    s_byte(0xc2, full_range=True)
    # Function Code
    s_byte(0x0d, full_range=True)
    # Static Data for now..
    s_static("AAAAAAA") ←
    # This will fuzz a huge array of string cases..
    s_block_end()
s_checksum("Data", algorithm=dnpcrc16, length=2)

```

s_string("A") + Chunkdnp3(data)

```
s_initialize("ICCP-TPKT")
if s_block_start("header"):
    s_byte(0x03, full_range=True)
        # Version
    s_byte(0x00, full_range=True)
        # Reserved
    s_short(0x0000)
        # Length ←
    s_block_end()
```

This length includes the header
and data information from other
layers

ICCP – COTP Code Snippet

```

s_initialize("ICCP-COTP")
s_sizer("header", length=1, name="length", fuzzable=True)
# Length
if s_block_start("header"):
    s_byte(0xE0, full_range=True)
        # PDU Type
    s_short(0x0000)
        # Destination Reference
    s_short(0x0000)
        # Source Reference
    s_byte(0x00, full_range=True)
        # Class/Options
    s_byte(0xc1)
        # Parameter Code Source TSAP
    s_sizer("Param1", length=1, name="ParamLength1", fuzzable=True)
    if s_block_start("Param1"):
        s_string("A")
        s_block_end()

    s_byte(0xc2)
        # Parameter Code Destination TSAP
    s_sizer("Param2", length=1, name="ParamLength2", fuzzable=True)
    if s_block_start("Param2"):
        s_string("A")
        s_block_end()

    s_byte(0xc0)
        # Parameter Code TPDU Size
    s_sizer("Param3", length=1, name="ParamLength3", fuzzable=True)
    if s_block_start("Param3"):
        s_byte(0x0b)
        s_block_end()
    s_block_end()

```

Source TSAP

Destination TSAP

TPDU Size

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Demo

- Please be responsible and use responsible disclosure methods when you do find some vulnerabilities

- Basic SCADA network architecture
- Need for security in SCADA network
- SCADA protocol details
- Fuzzer details

- Other SCADA Protocols.
- Two way fuzzing

- The SCADA Architecture and basic implementation details: **Securing SCADA Systems – Ronald L. Krutz. PhD**
- Modbus: www.modbus.org
- DNP3: www.dnp3.org
- ICCP: www.iccp.org
- Attack Details: www.digitalbond.com
- Modbus Protocol details: http://www.modbustools.com/PI_MBUS_300.pdf
- DNP3 Protocol Primer: <http://www.dnp.org/About/DNP3%20Primer%20Rev%20A.pdf>
- DNP3 User and Reference Manual by Control Microsystems: https://dq.controlmicrosystems.com/Technical%20Support/Software,%20Manuals%20and%20Release%20Notes/Protocols/DNP3%20Protocol/Manuals/DNP3_User_and_Reference_Manual.pdf
- ICCP Guide: www.sisconet.com/downloads/usrguid5.doc
- Matt Franz Wiki: <http://www.scadasec.net/secwiki/SecProducts>
- Wikipedia
- SCADA Architecture slides - ??

- **Pedram Amini, Aaron Portnoy and Cody Pierce** for working on the Sulley Fuzzing Framework
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Questions?

Thank you

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