Detecting Bluetooth Surveillance Systems

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http://perimetergrid.com

DefCon 22
They’re Already Watching
Federal Highway Administration
Installing Bluetooth Detectors
Form Factors
Seattle Experiments

Travel Time Data Obtained from Bluetooth Technology

From the WSDOT Research Office
December 2011

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contents do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the Washington
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Introduction

Roadway users easily understand travel
time, and consider it one of the most
important transportation metrics. Users
often get travel time directly through
dynamic message signs (DMS), 511
drive time services, and online systems that
and the Internet, allowing researchers
to develop a MAC address-based
tracking method. This method relies
on recording the MAC addresses of
bypassing devices at one location
and noting the time difference

The cost of the Bluetooth reader, and that
the MAC address collection device
spans multiple lanes. This provides
a significant advantage compared to
Automatic License Plate Recognition
(AlPR) systems that require lane-based
detection to determine travel times.
Additionally, Bluetooth-based travel
time data collection systems are easy to install
and do not require high bandwidth for
communications. Compared to Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), the MAC
address-based systems do not require
willing volunteers with vehicles equipped
to provide constantly recorded GPS
coordinates. Instead, all surrounding
devices get free broadcast of the MAC
address. Users not wishing to disclose
their location can simply turn off the
broadcast function on their MAC devices.

Although the MAC address-based
collection techniques have significant
advantages, there are some drawbacks
to their use. Relatively small sample

State to monitor JBLM traffic congestion
with Bluetooth

BY BRYNNI GRIMLEY
Staff writer January 31, 2014

If you drive Interstate 5 from Lacey to Tacoma and have a Bluetooth device, chances are you’re
going to be tracked in the next couple of weeks.

No, it’s not the National Security Agency monitoring your every move. It’s the state Department of
Transportation.

The tracking of Bluetooth devices — or, more accurately, the unique address they emit — is part
of the state’s effort to study congestion on the I-5 corridor around Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

For those unnerved by the idea of being tracked, transportation officials say there’s nothing to
worry about. "We cannot track people or hear conversations, nor do we want to. All we know is the
signal," said Jon Pascal, principal at Transpo Group, the Kirkland-based company deploying the
Why Bluetooth?
Bluetooth vs. Loops, Radar, ALPR, and Pilot Cars

✧ More data
  ✧ Loops gather volume only
  ✧ Radar gathers volume and speed
  ✧ Bluetooth provides volume, speed, and route choice

✧ Inexpensive
  ✧ $2000-5000 per detector
  ✧ Cellular modem & solar power with battery back-up or PoE

✧ Limitations
  ✧ 3-6% sample rate, plus trucks oversampled
  ✧ Sensitive to site characteristics & antenna placement

✧ Fewer privacy concerns?
Information Leakage

- Frequency-hopping pattern derived from MAC address

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Significant Address Part (NAP)</th>
<th>Upper Address Part (UAP)</th>
<th>Lower Address Part (LAP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>4E:22:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturer-assigned, irrelevant</td>
<td>Can be derived from traffic</td>
<td>Sent in every packet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Any device can send an inquiry from the GIAC anonymous address, 9E:8B:33:16
  - Devices set Discoverable will respond from their MAC, revealing LAP

- Any device that knows your MAC can initiate a connection
  - Connection attempts always get device name, class, service list, and clock offset
  - Can also sniff traffic with UAP+LAP, but it’s encrypted
Scanning Bluetooth

- Inquiry-based tracking
  - Scanner just spams Bluetooth inquiries
  - Gets all discoverable stations in range every 10.48 seconds

- Connection-based tracking
  - Scanner keeps paging for ACL and L2CAP connections
  - Works without discoverability, but only for known LAPs

- Passive sniffing
  - Scanner sweeps the Bluetooth frequency range and gathers sampled packets
  - Works without discoverability, provides only LAP, can’t sniff data
  - Requires nonstandard hardware, not OTS Bluetooth transceivers
Seattle Deployment

Figure 4-1: a) Selected freeway test corridor on SR 520, b) Bluetooth sensor (left) and portable ALPR (right) used to collect travel time data at the 24th Ave location.

Figure 4-10: Relative shares of detected device manufacturers

will be in use. Such devices could include a valve-cap pressure sensor that broadcasts tire pressure to the main in-vehicle computer system or a temperature sensor on the vehicle windshield. Knowing the types of devices present may allow for finer-grained analysis, such as distinguishing between passenger vehicle and truck travel times.
Privacy Concerns?
Privacy protection and filtration

Of course, Bluetooth devices within vehicles might not be the only ones to pass a reader—pedestrians, transit riders, etc., could all be in possession of their own Bluetooth-enabled technologies. Will these not influence readings? “Our host software uses various statistically based algorithms to filter matches that appear to be outliers,” explains TTI’s Tony Voigt. “These algorithms can be configured based on the characteristics of each individual segment being monitored.”

The research engineer admits the distinction of transit vehicles versus other vehicles and pedestrians is difficult in practice, but possible using TTI’s in-house-developed field software processes. “Much of our intellectual property is based on this. We have seen gains in matches of 50% over other processes with our patent-pending methods, which allow for a more robust analysis capability, including potentially differentiating transit vehicles.

A further critical aspect of the TTI process is privacy protection. “We have the capability to make the MAC address data collected anonymous before transmitting from the field, which we can do without any reduction in the fidelity of the data.” But isn’t anonymity a major benefit of Bluetooth? If MAC addresses are not linked to a user, why the extra process? “If there is even a very small chance that a hacker could sniff the communications pathway from field to host, there should be procedures and protocols in place to minimize the threat.”

Voigt says anonymizing the data may be more of a benefit if the raw data is archived for later analysis. A partial MAC address when anonymized then archived is less subject to scrutiny, although there are methods to use to enable further use of the data for operational and planning purposes, such as higher-level origin/destination studies.
functioning properly and has not been tampered with. Once the synchronization and location recording are complete, the device begins data collection, recording the bypassing MAC addresses and their respective timestamps. As data are collected, they are sent over the GSM network to a server in STAR Lab, where the MACs are kept for a specified period (currently 60 minutes). If a matching MAC is received during this period, a travel time is calculated, the MAC address is deleted, and the data are uploaded to the Digital Roadway Interactive Visualization and Evaluation Network (DRIVE Net) developed by the STAR Lab for data sharing, modeling, and online analysis (Ma et al., 2011). This approach to data collection allows real-time information to flow to users while maintaining a level of privacy. Figure 3-3 illustrates the overarching structure of the data collection effort.
No Privacy Concerns
Canadian Border Deployment

Figure 4-5: SR 539 and Badger Rd. Bluetooth installation location

Figure 4-6: SR 539 U.S.-Canada border Bluetooth installation location
Privacy Mitigations

- Capturing LAP only
  - No central registry of Bluetooth MACs to devices or purchasers
  - LAP is 24 bits, not globally unique

- Anonymizing LAP
  - Needs to remain unique
  - Hash before storing; salted hash is possible

- Limited Retention
  - UW STAR Lab experiment limited to 60 minutes
  - Commercial readers often limit to 20 minutes
LAP only?

- Remember this slide?
- LAP does not permit manufacturer identification; UAP is captured
- Not globally unique?
- 1 in 24,048,576 is pretty unique in most metro areas.
- Have two or more devices in your car?

![Pie chart showing relative shares of detected device manufacturers](image.png)
Anonymizing LAP?

- There are $8 \times 10^{67}$ ways to shuffle a deck of cards, which is about 225 bits of entropy.
- If you do it by calling `rand()`, there’s only $4 \times 10^9$ ways to shuffle a deck of cards, 32 bits of entropy.
- Taking 256-bit salted hashes of a 24-bit LAP is useless.
Limited Retention

Edward Snowden by way of the Washington Post
Making our Own
Bluetooth Scanning for Fun and Profit

- Bluetooth transceivers can send and receive, but only beacons or when paired
  - Class 1: 100 mW, 100m range
  - Class 2: 2.5 mW, 10m range
  - Class 3: 1 mW, 1m range

- Commercial Bluetooth “sniffers” can grab all channels for the low price of $10,000
  - Receive-only, no transmission
  - Still single- or dual-antenna “sweep,” not true all-channel receive
Ubertooth One

CC2591 → LPC175x
Full-Speed USB
CC2400 → RP-SMA

EXPAND:

GND 1 2 3 4 5 6
P[15]: TXD1/SCK0/SCK
P[17]: CTS1/MISO0/MISO
P[16]: RXD1/SELO/SEL
P[18]: DCD1/MOSI0/MOSI

Ubertooth One r161 Roadmap
PC-Based Bluetooth Scanner

- Linux required, no Windows Ubertooth drivers exist
  - Can use a Linux VM
  - Need WinUSB driver associated with Ubertooth to pass it through to the VM

- Equipment:
  - Old ThinkPad in the garage, or a VirtualBox VM, $0
  - Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS 64-bit Desktop, $0
  - Ubertooth One, $119 or build your own
  - GlobalSat ND-100S USB GPS Dongle, $37
  - Azio BTD-V201 USB Micro Bluetooth Adapter, Class 1, V2.1 + EDR, $16
$ sudo apt-get update; sudo apt-get upgrade

$ sudo apt-get install libusb-1.0-0-dev libbluetooth-dev libusb-dev libpcap-dev libpcap0.8-dev libcap-dev pkg-config libnl-dev libncurses5-dev libpcre3-dev gpsd gpsd-clients python-gps bluez python-pyside.qtgui

$ wget https://github.com/walac/pyusb/archive/1.0.0b1.tar.gz

$ wget https://github.com/greatscottgadgets/libbtbb/archive/2014-02-R2.tar.gz

$ wget https://github.com/greatscottgadgets/ubertooth/archive/2014-02-R2.tar.gz

$ wget https://www.kismetwireless.net/code/kismet-2013-03-R1b.tar.xz

Make and install all of that. Use the non-phyneteal plugin. See Ubertooth Wiki if you need help.

Reboot or $ sudo ldconfig before running tools.
ARM-Based Bluetooth Scanner

- Raspberry Pi is an inexpensive ($35) open-source hardware platform
  - Based on ARM architecture, Runs on 5V USB power
  - 2 USB ports, HDMI, audio, GPIO pins with SPI capability

- Equipment:
  - Raspberry Pi, $40
  - Adafruit PiTFT minkit (optional), $35
  - Adafruit PiBow enclosure (optional), $22
  - Gear from PC build: Ubertooth One, GlobalSat ND-100S USB GPS Dongle, Azio BTD-V201 USB Micro Bluetooth Adapter, Class 1, V2.1 + EDR
  - 5V 500 mA USB power source: car charger or Gorilla Gadgets External Battery Pack, $29
  - Powered USB hub, with power
Install latest Raspbian image. If using PiTFT, use Adafruit image instead.

$ sudo rpi-update; sudo apt-get update; sudo apt-get upgrade

$ sudo apt-get install libusb-1.0-0-dev libbluetooth-dev libusb-dev libpcap-dev libpcap0.8-dev libcap-dev pkg-config libnl-dev libncurses5-dev libpcre3-dev gpsd gpsd-clients python-gps bluez python-pyside.qtgui

$ wget https://github.com/walac/pyusb/archive/1.0.0b1.tar.gz

$ wget https://github.com/greatscottgadgets/libbtbb/archive/2014-02-R2.tar.gz

$ wget https://github.com/greatscottgadgets/ubertooth/archive/2014-02-R2.tar.gz

$ wget https://www.kismetwireless.net/code/kismet-2013-03-R1b.tar.xz

Make and install all of that. Use the non-phyneutral plugin. See Ubertooth Wiki if you need help.

Reboot or sudo ldconfig
$ sudo usermod -G kismet,plugdev -a pi

In ~/ubertooth/host/libubertooth, modify 40-ubertooth.rules to change "usb" to "plugdev"

$ sudo cp ~/ubertooth/host/libubertooth/40-ubertooth.rules /etc/udev/rules.d

$ sudo adduser scanner

$ sudo usermod scanner -a -G adm,dialout,sudo,video,plugdev,users,netdev,input,spi,gpio,kisme

Modify /etc/inittab:

-"1:2345:respawn:/sbin/getty --noclear 38400 tty1"

+"1:2345:respawn:/bin/login -f scanner tty1 </dev/tty1 >/dev/tty1 2>&1"

Modify /etc/sudoers:

+"scanner ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL"
$ sudo dpkg-reconfigure -plow gpsd

Modify /etc/default/gpsd:

```
GPSD_OPTIONS="/dev/ttyUSB0"
DEVICES=""
START_DAEMON="true"
SBAUTO="true"
GPSD_SOCKET="/var/run/gpsd.sock"
```

Run $ kismet -c ubertooth, enable ubertooth_ui plugin and configure UI

Modify bashrc:

```
+"kismet -c ubertooth"
```
Issues

- Raspberry Pi power issues
  - Pi USB ports provide only 140mA, not enough for Ub妥ooth & GPS
  - Powered USB hub, modified to get power from USB, solves this problem

- Ub妥ooth + Kismet issues
  - *** glibc detected *** kismet_server: corrupted double-linked list: 0x00ce8348 ***
  - kernel: [4474.980885] kismet_server[6253]: segfault at 131ff6b618 ip 00007f2e31cedbe6 sp 00007f8bf5a25a0 error 4 in libc-2.13.so[7f2e31c74000+182000]

- Unknown version conflict
  - Works flawlessly on Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS and Ubuntu 14.04
  - Issue occurs on Raspbian (all versions), Kali 1.0.7
  - Known issue under investigation
Scanning

- **ubertooth-scan**
  - Performs an inquiry scan, as we suspect the DoT does
  - Requires both Ubertooth One and a functioning Bluetooth transceiver
  - Takes 10.24 seconds to be sure of catching all devices
  - Reports LAP only

- **kismet -c ubertooth**
  - Performs passive monitoring on all frequencies
  - Requires Ubertooth One only
  - Continuous sweep, will miss things
  - Reports LAP always, UAP with enough data
  - Bluetooth and GPS logging
Results
Inquiry Scan

Areas on Seattle area highways showing recurrent inquiry activity

Transmissions from 9E:8B:33:16

Locations match expected spots for route choice tracking, also DoT traffic cameras.

Notably absent: SR520 bridge, home of known Bluetooth speed sensors.
Passive Sniffing

Multiple areas where an address was found for ~700M

Approximates the area covered by a Class 1 Bluetooth transceiver

Locations were a subset of inquiry scan locations!

Notably absent: SR520 bridge, home of known Bluetooth speed sensors
Countermeasures

- Turn off your phone!
  - Harder to turn off the Bluetooth transceivers in your car
  - Use Ubertooth to check your own signals
- Spoof other addresses
  - Find addresses with kismet, ubertooth-scan, or hcitool-scan
  - Install bluesmash-tools (included in BackTrack and Kali)
  - $ ./bdaddr -i hci0 00:01:02:03:04:05
  - Can duplicate multiple addresses with multiple transceivers